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ABSTRACT 
 
This paper assesses the development potential of local inter-firm networks in Newly Industrializing 
Countries. This is done through an analysis of the role of such networks in the growth of the software 
industry in the Republic of Ireland. Transnational software companies located in Ireland developed extensive 
local supply networks. Local social networks and a local culture of innovation contributed to the growth of 
an indigenous software development sector. 
 While local networks can generate significant competitive advantage for a region they are inevitably 
internationalized as successful firms organize globally or as the region attracts further foreign investment. 
Corporations utilize local networks to solve problems of cost, control and innovation management in the 
globalization of production and corporate organization.While fostering local networks can be an effective 
public policy, it is not sufficient for development. The role of the state in supporting, guiding and bargaining 
with local firms in these networks remains a crucial aspect of development strategy.  
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
In December 1994 a headline in The Irish Times, a major newspaper in the Republic of Ireland, announced 
that Ireland was `Inching closer to aim of becoming Europe's offshore Silicon Valley'. This headline captures 
perfectly the opportunities and contradictions of local economic development in a global information 
economy. Newly Industrializing Countries (NICs) seek to emulate the dynamic growth and innovative 
environment of regions such as Silicon Valley while in a subordinate `offshore' relationship to the major 
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centres of the global economy, including Silicon Valley itself. 
 
Recent research on local networks of firms has argued that such aspirations are plausible because local 
learning networks can at least weaken the impact of global inequalities in resources and power. Other authors 
argue that such local networks will inevitably be dominated by global flows of resources and transnational 
forms of corporate organization and that development strategies based on such networks have limited 
potential. This paper considers the potential and limits of fostering local learning networks as a development 
strategy for semi-peripheral countries by analyzing the growth of the Irish software industry over the last 10 
years. It analyzes the intersection of local and global networks which characterizes the industry and shows 
how they constitute each other over time. 
 
The Republic of Ireland is an ideal case in which to assess the prospects for NICs of achieving these goals. 
Since the late 1980s it has attracted a greatly disproportionate share of U.S. information technology foreign 
direct investment in Europe. It has also developed a healthy indigenous electronics sub-supply sector and a 
growing indigenous software industry. The information technology sector has been the driving force behind 
the fastest GNP and employment growth levels within the European Union in recent years - although some of 
this growth is illusory due to the repatriation of profits by transnational corporations (Shirlow, 1995).  
 
Nonetheless, the Irish experience offers some valuable insights into the possibilities for building innovative 
local economies in an era when participation in the global economy has become a fundamental part of 
successful economic development strategies. Ireland's `industrialization by invitation' policy has attracted 
considerable public and academic skepticism over the years. However, now in the 1990s, a new debate is 
taking place over the effectiveness of such a policy. In this paper I examine the variety of ways in which the 
Irish software cluster or agglomeration intersects with the global economy and the implications of this for 
efforts to build a `territorial learning economy' on the Silicon Valley model. I draw on 50 interviews carried 
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out with managers and executives in the software industry in both Silicon Valley and Ireland between 
October 1995 and March 1996.   
 
THE CHALLENGE OF GLOBALIZATION 
The appeal of local learning networks to communities and policy-makers can only be understood within the 
context of  the increasing global integration of the world economy. Before considering the dynamics of local 
networks we need to analyze the process of deterritorialization, the reduced dependency of certain economic 
functions on the particular places in which they are located, which is the focus of most theorists of 
globalization. 
 
Early analyses of globalization concentrated on the search for low-cost labour by capital as a response to the 
crisis of Fordist accumulation in advanced capitalist countries. This search for ever cheaper labour was said 
to be an imperative for leading corporations if they were to sustain their competitive positions (Frobel et al, 
1980). Capital mobility and the transnational organization of production cemented the power of transnational 
capital over local labour and drove down wages and benefits. Network forms of organization allowed the 
most powerful firms to shift the burden of productive flexibility onto their suppliers in particular (Harrison, 
1994; Shaiken, 1994; Burawoy, 1985; Amin and Robins, 1990).  The organization of regional economies into 
positions in hierarchical ‘global commodity chains’ created patterns of uneven international development 
(Gereffi, 1994). The ability of localities to develop relatively autonomous development strategies was 
constrained by the capacity of transnational corporations to use capital mobility to improve their cost 
structure and cement their power. 
 
Other authors argue that a more or less fully integrated global economy has come into existence as  
production, technology and markets are organized on a transnational basis. Corporations do not so much 
pursue globalization as a strategy, rather they experience it as a condition of their existence  (Castells, 1989). 
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The localities, firms and individuals who were able to develop their own conceptual skills and competencies 
and to build connections to the centres of excellence in the world economy would become the `world class' 
(Kanter, 1995).  These connections could be based on `virtual' work teams and organizations (Reich, 1991) or 
on corporate organizational structures (Kanter, 1995) but the crucial connections were on a global scale. 
Localities should mold themselves into `milieux of innovation' and centres of learning but development 
would only come as they fully integrated into global networks and institutions. From this perspective the 
demands for flexibility, constant innovation and global connections were a fact of life for both workers and 
corporations, presenting both with new challenges but also opening up new opportunities. 
 
Cost,  power and innovation have all therefore been advanced as reasons why regional economies have no 
option but to integrate themselves as fully as possible into global networks. Within these frameworks 
different regions may have particular advantages over others but only the most dominant regions can assert 
control over their own economic and social development. Even for those regions which could forge 
connections to the global economy these connections were a mixed blessing. Not only were they unable to 
control the global processes they were part of but the pre-existing  hierarchical organization of the global 
economy constrained their ability to create a regional dynamic of development. 
 
 
THE LOCAL AND REGIONAL RESPONSE 
Such analyses of the globalization of the economy could easily lead to despair on the part of both analysts 
and policy makers concerned with regional development, not to mention the populations of declining or 
excluded regions. However, over the past 15 years, a great deal of research has focused on the continuing 
territorial basis of economic activity and the persistent role for the region as a force in economic 
development. The success of certain localities, highlighted most prominently by Piore and Sabel's The 
Second Industrial Divide (1984), sparked a resurgence of hope that localities could generate a relatively 
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autonomous and self-sustaining dynamic of growth rather than being caught in the trap of dependency on 
core firms and regions. 
 
Localities were encouraged to refashion themselves as `industrial districts' (Piore and Sabel, 1984), 
`industrial clusters' (Porter, 1990), `technopoles' (Castells and Hall, 1994), `regional networks' (Saxenian, 
1994), `territorial learning economies ' (Storper, 1992) and so on. Although these localities were often 
acknowledged to have strong connections to the global economy, local networks were implicitly assumed to 
be the basis of self-reproducing development. Economic globalization was usually thought of as the 
globalization of markets and the impact of global organizational links on local networks was rarely examined 
explicitly. . 
 
The literature on territorial economies provided a number of reasons why regional production systems could 
solve the cost, power and innovation challenges of globalization. Significant cost economies were said to 
result from the agglomeration of firms and industries in a specific region as traded and untraded 
interdependencies developed between employers, workers and regional institutions which made production 
more efficient (Scott, 1995;Storper and Walker, 1989). “In very general terms, territorial complexes not only 
lower tangible costs of transport and communication, but ease information-sharing, allow pooling of labor 
and fixed capital, stabilize physical and social relations, help people identify with each other ( and against 
outside competitors), and generate distinct cultural practices over time” (Storper and Walker, 1989: 139). 
These factors meant that localities could develop significant sources of competitive advantage and cost 
economies based precisely on the fact that they were `local'.  
 
Furthermore, although the output of ‘informational goods’ (such as software packages, books and magazines, 
videos) are highly portable around the world, the conditions of effective innovation and design of such 
‘information-intensive’ goods (i.e. their inputs) are fundamentally territorial, according to these authors. 
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Innovation could be attained through collective learning and adaptability founded on relationships of 
cooperation and trust. Dense networks of face-to-face social relations between firms, between managers and 
employees, and within the local labour market were the critical sources of innovation and adaptability in the 
industrial system and  were possible only on a spatially limited scale. Saxenian (1994) outlines the key 
elements of the Silicon Valley ‘regional advantage’ - loosely linked teams within firms, various forms of 
cooperation and flows of information between firms, and close links between firms and universities, business 
services firms and other local institutions: "Silicon Valley has a regional network-based industrial system that 
promotes collective learning and flexible adjustment among specialist producers of a complex of related 
technologies .....  The functional boundaries within firms are porous in a network system, as are the 
boundaries between firms themselves and between firms and local institutions such as trade associations and 
universities' (Saxenian, 1994:2-3). It is these interlocking institutions which sustain the social relations which 
are the basis of continuous learning, innovation and therefore growth. Firms which fail to develop these fluid 
relationships with other firms are doomed to commercial failure - firms which detach themselves from their 
local networks do so at their peril. 
 
While the early emphasis in the literature was on craft traditions and networks of small firms (Piore and 
Sabel, 1984), the literature soon elaborated the social relations and institutional frameworks underlying these 
economies and extended its analysis to a variety of high-technology industries and networks including a 
range of types and sizes of firms (Saxenian, 1994; Scott, 1991; Sabel, 1994). The literature began to shift 
from an emphasis on  `industrial districts', which had an almost mythical status, to the more recognizable 
`territorial learning economies' (Storper, 1992). 
 
The territorialization of economic life held out the prospect to some authors of weakening some of the power 
inequalities observed by the theorists of globalization. Sabel (1994) argues that the paradigmatic social 
relations in such economies are neither historically given patterns of trust and collective sensibility, nor 
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purely strategic cooperation based on repeated interactions - although both of these may play a part. Instead, 
he argues, relations of `learning by monitoring' are at the core of these economies. Drawing on examples 
from the Japanese economy, he points out that parties to a business relationship monitor each other out of 
distrust and in the normal course of the relationship. However, monitoring can become, under the correct 
conditions, a way for the parties to the relationship to learn from one another through the information which 
is exchanged in the monitoring process. As the relationship continues in this cycle of learning and 
monitoring, the parties become involved in a collective project through working on a common problem. 
Workers in firms which are involved in such relationships begin to share certain identities and interests, 
although never being required to make the `leap of faith' into mutual trust which the early literature on 
industrial districts seemed to require of any potential candidates for participation in a network. There is at 
least the implication of an increasing equality and reciprocity in these relations between firms. 
 
THE GLOBAL AND THE LOCAL 
Globalization theorists tend to see localities as almost completely constrained by the structure of the global 
economy and transnational systems of production and innovation. Localities are forced to make themselves 
willing conduits of global flows in case they suffer the most disastrous fate - being ‘switched out’ of this 
‘space of flows’ (Castells, 1996). Localities can move up the global hierarchy but the hierarchy remains 
essentially beyond the influence of the localities themselves.  
 
Theorists of local and regional economic dynamics tend to see the global economy as the context for local 
economies. Inputs and outputs move between regions largely by trade and markets, not through corporate 
organizational structures (Storper, 1992). Where these organizational structures exist their global integration 
is implied to be of a loose enough nature that the dynamics of the region can be analyzed with little reference 
to these global networks (Sabel, 1989). Where globalization theorists take local dynamics as over-determined 
by global forces and flows, localization theorists take the global as merely a context which provides inputs 
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and takes away outputs but which has little impact on the dynamics of local development. 
 
The historical development of the Irish software industry can shed some light on these competing claims 
about network forms of organization  and their implications for developing regions and countries trying to 
move up in the international division of labour by developing such local networks. An examination of the 
Irish case shows that the global penetration of local networks is inevitable and that, while the network form 
of corporate organization does offer some opportunities to developing countries, the developmental impact of 
local networks is severely constrained unless specific policies exist to guide the evolution of the networks. 
The role of the state in guiding the development of these networks and in supporting the local agglomeration 
is crucial.  
 
The new social relations of cooperation and teamwork, ‘learning by monitoring’ are the new `contested 
terrain' upon which conflicts and power struggles take place. Cooperation and power relations can coexist 
and indeed may operate through one another rather than simply having effects on one another. Relations of 
`learning by monitoring'  will nearly always involve inequalities of power and resources. This means that the 
patterns of learning  may be unequal, that the returns to learning in the relationship may be unequal and that 
one firm may become the dominant partner which controls the direction of the relationship. 
 
Regional economic agglomerations and their dense business and social turn out to be crucial to the 
management of global flows and to the creation and maintenance of the social relations which make global 
networks work. Global networks do not simply flow through these regional agglomerations but are 
themselves organized by the activities of those in the regions. These regions form a ‘grid of places’ which are 
not so much receptacles of global flows nor obstacles to them but turn out to be engaged in constantly 
making and remaking these global connections and processes, albeit not under conditions of their own 
choosing (Sassen, 1995). The activities of  innovative regions such as Silicon Valley and its many imitators 
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are closer to those of ‘global cities’ and state bodies than has sometimes been thought (Sassen, 1991, 1995).  
 
THE GROWTH OF THE IRISH SOFTWARE INDUSTRY 
The most dynamic sector in the Irish economy, particularly in the 1990s, has been the information 
technology sector - prompting Castells and Hall to list "Ireland's electronics agglomeration" as one of the 
emerging `technopoles' in the world economy (1994: 7). In 1993 electronics accounted for one third of all 
industrial exports, over $6 billion, and for 9% of all industrial employment with an estimated 30,000 
employees in the industry (Trench, 1995). Just over 10% of employment in this industry was in Irish firms, 
similar to the 9% recorded in the 1980s (O'Brien, 1986). The electronics industry, and in particular 
computing, has been growing at a rapid rate with prominent PC makers such as AST, Gateway and Apple 
investing in Ireland; an influx of network product manufacturers such as 3Com; and the location of one of 
Intel's new wafer fabrication plants just outside Dublin (see Ó Riain, 1997). 
 
My research however concentrates on the emerging software industry in Ireland. Software accounted for $2.8 
billion in exports in 1993 and employed 9,000 people (National Software Directorate, 1993). By 1995 this 
had risen to $4.4 billion and 11,784. Ireland is currently the second largest exporter of software after the US - 
although this figure is deceptive as a great deal of revenues come from the translation, duplication and 
assembly of packaged software for transnational corporations such as Microsoft, Claris and Symantec. 
Nonetheless, indigenous software company exports increased 89% from 1991 to 1993 to reach a level of 
$190 million, and by another 95% to $357 million by 1995. These figures compare favourably to the 
performance of the much talked about Indian and Israeli software  industries (see Table 1).  
 
Table 1: Sales and Exports in the Indigenous* Software Industry in India, Ireland and Israel 1993-1995 
 
Year Sales ($ million) Exports ($ million) 
 
Exports as % of total sales  
 India Ireland  Israel India Ireland Israel India Ireland Israel 
1993 388 368 700 225 190 175 58% 52% 25% 
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1994 554 - 790 330 - 220 60% - 28% 
1995 823 610 - 485 357 - 59% 59% - 
Sources: NASSCOM (1996), NSD (1993), Israeli Association of Software Houses (1995). 
Note: Figures may not be strictly comparable as survey coverage and methodologies are different. 
* Figures for India include TNCs, figures for Ireland and Israel do not. 
 
Before going on to the analysis proper, I will briefly outline the structure of the Irish software industry. The 
rapid growth of the industry is illustrated in Table 2 below. Industry revenues and exports are dominated by 
foreign companies, although domestic companies' exports are growing both in volume and as a proportion of 
their revenues (see Table 1). Employment is split evenly between the Irish and foreign companies. This is 
very unusual in Ireland where sectors tend to be dominated either by foreign or domestic firms. 90% of 
employment in the electronics industry was in foreign firms in the 1980s, and this trend has continued with 
the renewed growth in the 1990s (O'Brien, 1986; Trench, 1995). The software industry is a perfect case 
therefore in which to examine the interaction of local and global factors and how they affect the growth of an 
industry. Furthermore, 75% of software companies and employment are located in the Dublin area and my 
interviews indicate that a local industry culture is emerging within the Dublin industry. 
 
Table 2: Number of Companies, Employment and Revenues of Foreign and Irish Ownership in the Irish 
Software Industry, 1987-1993. 
 
Year Foreign Owned Irish Owned 
 Firms  Employ-ment Revenue 
($ m.) 
Firms Employ-ment Revenue ($ 
m.) 
(% of total) 
1987 25 
(15%) 
600 
(33%) 
NA 140 
(85%) 
1230 
(67%) 
65 
(NA) 
1991 74 
(20%) 
3992 
(51%) 
2465 
(91%) 
291 
(80%) 
3801 
(49%) 
234 
(9%) 
1993 81 
(19%) 
4448 
(50%) 
2739 
(88%) 
336 
(81%) 
4495 
(50%) 
368 
(12%) 
1995 93 
(19%) 
6011 
(51%) 
4125 
(87%) 
390 
(81%) 
5773 
(49%) 
610 
(13%) 
Source: NSD (National Software Directorate), 1993; An Córas Tráchtála, 1987 
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However, these tables give a highly aggregated view of the industry. As I have noted above,  the industry is 
characterized by a number of quite distinct segments and production networks.  
 
The two which I analyze in detail are:  
(i) Software Logistics and Localization1: dominated by US transnational corporations who are carrying out 
low-end software development and language translation and are serviced by an extensive vendor base of 
printers, translation bureaus and other suppliers;   
(ii) Software Development: dominated by small and medium sized Irish-owned firms who are gaining 
growing recognition in international technical markets, are building partnerships with US firms and in some 
cases even going public in the US;  
 
The first sector is globally dominated but has an extensive local supplier base while the second emerged from 
a local set of dynamics but is being integrated into global business networks. The first reflects a state strategy 
of attracting  a disproportionate share of foreign investment in a specific sector and hoping for the emergence 
of a local learning network around this foreign investment. The second is an example of  the emergence of an 
indigenous industry which may then become a force internationally. In the following sections I examine the 
nature of the relationship between local and global actors in each of these sectors of the Irish software 
industry and how these relations structure the flow of resources into and out of the local economy. The co-
existence of these two sectors offers an opportunity to examine different combinations of localized and 
globalized development and their impact on patterns of economic development.  
                                                     
1'Localization’ of software refers to the process of customizing existing software packages for specific 
national and linguistic markets. The main activity is the translation of the text but it may also involve 
changing date formats, letter formats and other culture-specific aspects of the software. In U.S. software 
companies the work of designing the software programme so that it can be customized in this way is called 
‘internationalization’ and is generally carried out in the U.S. The work of actually customizing the 
programme for specific markets is called ‘localization’. This work is relatively uncomplicated and  is one of 
the primary activities of software TNCs in Ireland. This work of ‘localization’ should not be confused with 
the socio-economic processes of the ‘localization’ or ‘territorialization’ of production and innovation which 
has been discussed above. 
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 LOCALIZING THE GLOBAL? TRANSNATIONAL CORPORATIONS AND THEIR LOCAL 
NETWORKS  
Most of the TNCs located in Ireland, particularly those from the US, are carrying out software 
manufacturing, localization and distribution. There is a small degree of actual software engineering being 
carried out by the TNCs but this in many ways resembles the picture from India where "local critics accuse 
[TNCs] of generating `software exports' by directing their local software engineers to routine tasks that US 
software people would like to avoid, like debugging existing software, extending the life of old operating 
systems, or porting existing applications to different platforms" (Evans, 1995: 195). This is particularly clear 
among U.S. software companies which account for the bulk of TNC revenues and employment in Ireland and 
which are the focus of this paper. There are a small number of foreign owned companies serving purely local 
markets - predominantly the service arms of mainframe companies. However, most foreign owned 
companies are almost completely export-oriented and the sector is dominated by a small number of large 
companies (by Irish standards). Despite intense competition from Scotland and Holland among others, 
Ireland has become the undisputed premier location in Europe for software ‘localization’ - that is, the 
translation of already developed software products into the languages and cultural and technical formats 
which make them suitable for sale in new markets. The key activity here is the translation of the text of the 
programme itself but there is some low-level programming involved in preparing the text for translation and 
in reincorporating the translated text back into the programme. I will describe the historical development of 
this sector in terms of the interaction of the globalization and localization of economic activity involved at 
each stage and their impact on patterns of access to technological learning and commercialization 
opportunities. 
 
(i)  Betting on the Global: Attracting Software TNCs 
In the early to mid-1980s a number of US TNCs invested in software manufacturing operations in Ireland - 
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duplicating disks, getting manuals printed, and assembling them into shrink-wrapped packages. Lotus in 
1985, and Microsoft in 1986, set up manufacturing operations in the Dublin area. They were attracted by the 
viability of a low cost base within Europe and a friendly political environment.  
 
The financial and political environment was particularly hospitable. Export-oriented foreign companies only 
had to pay 10% corporate tax (compared to the standard 40%, now reduced to 38%) and this rate was 
guaranteed until 2010. This creates a net transfer from the European economy to the Irish economy and 
mainly to the TNCs due to TNC transfer pricing policies to take advantage of these tax rates. Irish industrial 
policy had been one of `industrialization by invitation' since the 1960s and the Industrial Development 
Authority (IDA) had developed significant skills in servicing the needs of multinationals. Successive 
governments pursued orthodox macroeconomic strategies which kept the financial environment very stable 
for these companies (particularly after 1987 when neo-corporatist wage-bargaining was institutionalized) 
and, despite some grumbling, there was little political opposition to the TNC-focussed industrial policy.  
 
IDA and government policy had structured the labour force specifically for international investment - 
investing heavily in new technical colleges in the 1970s in anticipation of new mobile international 
investment. When the investment was not initially forthcoming in the early 1980s emigration rates shot up 
but this investment in education has been crucial in providing a supply of well-educated technical and 
professional workers in recent years.   Furthermore, Irish workers were highly educated and English 
speaking.  
 
Irish wages, and particularly professional wages, were significantly lower than in other locations within the 
European Union and were likely to remain so with a young population, high unemployment (between 14 and 
18% for the last 10 years), enormous reserves of expatriate labour and relative industrial peace. Firms 
maintain a core workforce who are willing to work through the intense peaks of product releases and use 
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temporary and contract workers when necessary. The IDA reports that 12,740 jobs were added in all foreign 
companies in 1994, of which almost a quarter (3,000) were temp jobs. The long working hours characteristic 
of the industry are significantly out of step with most of Irish working life. Nonetheless, TNC managers in 
the US say they are extremely happy with the Irish `work ethic'. Overtime pay is extremely rare and work 
hours can extend to the point where one ex-manager of a major TNC told me that `if you count up the hours 
they worked then I don't think we were actually paying them that much per hour'. The Irish case can so far be 
seen as justifying the pessimism of many globalization theorists - Ireland was constrained to low cost 
production and political accommodation to the TNCs by the realities of the intense inter-state competition for 
corporate location and investment. 
 
As the 1980s went on however the TNCs, starting again with Lotus and Microsoft, added software 
localization work to their Irish operations. Driven by the potential for making a quick killing in international 
markets with very little extra development work, companies such as Microsoft invested heavily in 
customizing their products for US markets (68% of Microsoft's revenues in 1995 were from international 
markets (Cusumano and Selby, 1995: 5)). Companies were particularly eager to locate inside the European 
Union as 1992 and the Maastricht Treaty approached and they sought to establish themselves in the European 
market. 
 
While some TNCs did their localization work in the US, using immigrants and some US citizens with the 
appropriate language skills, the tendency was to decentralize the localization and translation function, thereby 
incorporating countries like Ireland into the lower end of the software design ‘commodity chain’ (Gereffi, 
1994). Very few companies decentralized the process completely however - Borland is one of the few who 
carries out all localization in their sales offices `in-country' (i.e. in the country which the localization is 
servicing). Most companies sought to establish a hub in Dublin which could manage the various international 
links which were essential to the localization process. Some companies kept localization and translation `in-
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house' and brought immigrants from the rest of Europe to Dublin. Most others outsourced the actual 
translation - either to independent contractors in the country of destination or to translation bureaus in Dublin 
which then managed the relations with the people doing the actual translation work (many of whom work at 
home at the end of a modem in locations scattered around Europe). So even where the labour force for a 
particular process is dispersed there is a tendency to manage the process from a centralized and specialized 
location. US managers said they liked to have a hub in Europe because that meant that they could consolidate 
their relationships between HQ and other firms and concentrate on the key strategic relationships from the 
US. They could deal with the subsidiary or main vendor in Ireland and then leave the web of European sub-
supply relationships to be managed by them directly. Thus corporations are able to maintain the dense 
network of relationships necessary for their operations by consolidating relationships around particular poles 
in the global structure. In particular, the subsidiary can handle the more unpredictable external relationships 
locally while it is easier to handle global relationships within the structure of corporate communications 
(sustained by constant travel, E-mail, videoconferencing and so on )  and shared intra-corporate 
understandings. The local organizational networks prove to be a crucial resource in stabilizing and 
maintaining control over global corporate networks. 
 
The increasing supply of computer science and language graduates in Ireland was critical to the growth of the 
localization function among the TNCs. Furthermore the ability to organize a supply of European labour - 
either through immigration or through international contracting - was a crucial factor. The development of a 
pool of experienced workers in a local labour market was therefore crucial (Scott, 1993). The labour markets 
are also however thoroughly internationalized - European migration to Dublin has increased, emigration 
through TNCs to core regions is quite significant and return migration from these regions has been a factor in 
the success of a number of companies. While localization is not particularly challenging work for computer 
science graduates some programmers take these jobs with a view to going to the US HQ to do genuine 
software development work. 
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 The story of software manufacturing and localization in Ireland partly supports globalization theories as 
Ireland was restricted to the lower reaches of hierarchical global production chains (Gereffi, 1994). However, 
these theories fail to recognize the crucial role of territorial production complexes in making deterritorialized 
socio-economic organization possible. Furthermore, the Irish software localization complex does not fit 
neatly into a spatial hierarchy of countries or regions around global input-output chains. The inputs (designs, 
investment, labour) to the production complex are largely from ‘core’ countries and the products are sold into 
the core markets of Western Europe. The Irish software localization complex is clearly low down the 
software commodity chain but it has a crucial role to play in managing relations between ‘core’ regions. As 
such, it defies conventional global production or commodity chain analysis. It also differs from the East 
Asian regional division of labour utlined by Henderson (1989) in that a ‘semi-peripheral’ country is 
mediating between ‘core’ countries’ rather than creating its own ‘periphery’ as the ‘Asian Tigers’ have done 
with Malaysia and the Phillipines among others. 
 
(ii) Local Bricks on Global Sand? Developing a Supplier Base
The 1970s had seen significant foreign investment in electronics in Ireland but the hoped-for development of 
a supplier base for these companies had failed to materialize (O'Brien, 1986; Eolas, 1989). However, the 
software manufacturing and localization investment of the 1980s and 1990s did create a local base of vendors 
supporting these industries.  
 
The first industry to benefit was the printing industry which had a pre-installed base in Ireland and was 
helped by the fact that the TNCs never printed their own manuals in-house. The Irish-born managers of these 
TNCs reputedly told the local printing firms  `we have the business for reprinted software manuals, it's there 
for you if you can get it'. These companies invested heavily in new technology and the industry grew from $9 
to $135 million in 5 years, based almost totally on the demand of the software TNCs (IDA, n.d.; Jacobson 
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and O'Sullivan, 1994). It is important to note the role of Irish-born managers in trying to develop other 
industries within the country. Indeed, it has been striking in my interviews the extent to which these 
managers see themselves as serving a project of national economic development through promoting the Irish 
operation and agitating for more sophisticated work for the Irish operation. `There's  a feeling that we're all in 
this to develop the industry in Ireland, so we help each other out by letting people over from the States visit 
each others' places and so on' (Irish Manager, US TNC).  This outlook has been prominent among Irish 
managers since the 1970s, emerging from the Irish management of Digital in particular. 
 
TNCs were also beginning to rely increasingly on outsourcing as a strategy during the 1980s to take 
advantage of external economies of scale and the potential for shirting costs onto suppliers. This trend 
intensified over the period - for example Lotus and Microsoft, which set up in the mid-80s, do nearly all of 
their own work in-house, while Oracle (set up 1990) and Novell (1995) outsource practically all their work 
and simply manage these relationships from their Dublin operations. 
 
This led to opportunities for a number of spin-off companies from TNCs or suppliers which grew solely on 
the basis of TNC contracts, such as BG Turnkey which was set up by an ex-Apple employee across the road 
from Apple in Cork. These companies tended to start with very basic operations and expanded to full turnkey 
operations where they would take responsibility for a whole segment of the production process. As more 
TNCs invested in Ireland the supplier base grew - with turnkey services growing from zero to $150 million in 
five years (IDA, n.d.). In the localization area, a number of Irish owned translation bureaus emerged which 
offered full translation services to TNCs doing localization in Ireland. Some of the founders of these 
companies had also worked for TNCs and their companies were also relatively dependent on TNC business. 
While this expansion has created some very successful firms, the firms remain vulnerable to their 
dependence on the TNCs and the sector as a whole is vulnerable to technological change. In particular, any 
moves to distributing software over the Internet would severely damage the manufacturing and distribution 
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sector within the software industry. 
 
The software logistics and localization industry in Ireland is characterized by an increased flattening of 
organizational relationships and the growth of external economies through supplier relations. Small 
inventories, manufacturing to order in very short time periods and increased use of suppliers result in dense 
inter-firm networks and intense communication. Jacobson and O'Sullivan (1994) document this process for 
software manual printers in Ireland but point out that the suppliers have retained a dependence on their TNC 
customers. Vendors’ access to the TNC is improved but the TNCs are careful to control the terms on which 
the negotiations take place. One Irish TNC manager told how the company wanted to be the first or second 
most important customer to a supplier so that they could get "the necessary attention". Relations with 
suppliers are close with constant monitoring of processes being accompanied by the provision of advice from 
TNCs to suppliers through regular meetings and information sharing. However, suppliers do not receive 
substantial resources from the TNCs to deal with problems that may arise. ‘Learning by monitoring’ brings 
efficiency and weakens formal hierarchies - it does not eliminate power differences and dependencies on 
large customers however. One TNC executive in Silicon Valley said one of the reasons they located in 
Ireland was that a TNC partner "had pre-bashed the suppliers for us".   
 
Supplier sectors absorb most of the demands for flexibility within the industry but they can make healthy 
profits where successful. There are ways in which companies can begin to escape their dependence on TNCs, 
largely by moving into new but related lines of business. One Irish-owned company whose founders had 
worked for major software TNCs in Ireland and the US used this experience to go into a business not simply 
servicing the TNCs but becoming republishers of already developed software in their own right. This 
company was able to use their international contacts to build markets and is doing well localizing and 
republishing the products of US companies for international markets. The key to their success is that they 
have managed to avoid a dependent supplier relationship and in fact own the software products they localize, 
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paying a royalty to the original developer on each copy sold. They have managed to negotiate a piece of the 
intellectual property rights for themselves rather than simply servicing the production needs of others. 
Logistics sub-supply companies may be able to use their knowledge of distribution channels and 
international business to move into servicing a broader range of sectors or to themselves build up skills in 
‘online’ delivery and support of products. 
 
There are some clear signs from this sector that even TNC-dominated sectors are experiencing a `new 
internationalization', with closer links and more extensive networks into the local economy, in place of the 
`old internationalization' model of isolated branch plants (Evans, 1995; Morris, 1992). New business 
strategies which emphasize outsourcing have produced a certain transfer of TNC expenditure into the local 
economy (Morris, 1992). However, in Irish software this expenditure remains much less than that of Irish-
owned companies and the value added by TNCs  within the country remains quite low. There are new 
opportunities for local development, certainly compared to the electronics industry, but the sector remains 
highly dependent on the TNCs.  
 
The ability to sustain relations with local suppliers while maintaining control over the parameters and 
conditions of the relationship is a crucial resource for TNCs in decentralizing production while maintaining 
centralized control (Harrison, 1994; Sassen, 1991). This points up the false dualism in the literature between 
globalization theorists’ view of localities as overwhelmed by global power structures and localization 
theorists’ view of local networks as a buffer against global domination and control. In fact, as regards the 
issue of power, local social relations are critical resources in the creation and maintenance of global networks 
of corporate control. Global power operates through and is constituted by local and regional  social networks 
and agglomerations (Sassen, 1991). 
 
(iii) Re-Globalizing the Local: The Supplier Base goes Global
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It seems than that there is a self-reinforcing dynamic of development at work here -  foreign investment has 
created some opportunities for suppliers and the development of the supplier base has reinforced the 
attractiveness of Ireland as a location for TNC business. However, this tale of TNC-led development of a 
local supplier agglomeration at the lower end of the technology chain in order to support its global operations 
is not the whole story. In fact each round of localization breeds further rounds of internationalization (Evans, 
1995:217).  The most successful vendors have tended to `go global' with their main customer(s) - so that BG 
Turnkey has operations next to Apple in Ireland and Sacramento and in the two other major European IT 
manufacturing regions - Scotland and Holland. These vendors also seem to take on US business practices - 
generally being non-union firms which use a variety of US-style Human Resource Management 
organizational strategies. 
 
There has also been an influx of foreign investment in the vendor base itself in the 1990s, often at the 
prompting of the IDA. Manufacturing and fulfillment companies such as KAO Infosystems of Japan and 
Logistix of Fremont, California, set up operations through investment in greenfield sites. Stream, a major US 
company, bought out Irish Printers and then expanded from its traditional printing and publishing business 
into localization and turnkey services. Other companies simply purchased Irish companies - a US firm called 
Banta purchased BG Turnkey, while Berlitz International (itself owned by Fukutake Publishing of Japan) 
bought out an Irish translation bureau called Softrans. 
 
These phases of internationalization of the industry bring resources into the industry infrastructure but 
weaken the structures of local accountability and ability to direct the development of the industry. Ireland has 
established itself as a location for these types of activities - an advantage which seems unlikely to disappear 
in the near future. The ability to release U.S.-designed products into global markets simultaneously with the 
U.S. release results in huge returns on TNCs’ intellectual property. The localization and logistics functions 
located in Ireland, although relatively low-tech, are critical to the capture of these returns.  This is a 
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significant difference from the previous international investment of the 1970s and early 1980s. However, as 
we have seen, the ability to negotiate the parameters of this development is very restricted and the whole 
localization and logistics sector remains highly vulnerable to changes in TNC strategies and technological 
shifts towards provision of CD-Roms in the short-term and, more fundamentally, towards on-line provision 
of software in the long-term.  
 
(iv) Regional Hubs in Europe: Expanding the Irish Operations
In the last couple of years, the TNCs have tended to self-consciously centralize their operations into a hub or 
hubs within the European market. While sales and marketing generally stays in the major commercial centres 
of London, Paris and so on, other countries like Ireland, Scotland and Holland now compete for the 
`operations hubs' of the TNCs. These countries have all developed their own information technology 
agglomerations or districts - this has become the basis of getting your foot in the door of international chains 
of production and innovation. 
 
The prospects of those TNCs doing localization work moving into software development seem quite dim and 
the links between those few companies doing genuine software engineering and local software development 
firms are weak. Many managers said that getting TNCs to locate product development in Ireland, or 
anywhere outside the US, is `a constant struggle'. `It's keeping an eye on the crown jewels, they won't let 
them go. They are afraid of losing control, that's a big issue for them' said one Dublin engineer with 
extensive experience in a TNC. Another manager in a US TNC said that while HQ might worry initially 
about the technical ability in Ireland it becomes an issue of control: `I don't think it's a skill thing, it's a 
control thing. Its a distance thing too, they can't see what's going on'. 
 
A manager in a third TNC which does all the porting for its `European' computer platforms in Dublin had 
experienced similar problems in getting development work moved out of the US.  `They like to keep control 
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of development. And then communication problems are a big issue when you can't just walk down the hall to 
talk to someone and you have to deal with the time differences ..... Some people in the US don't even know 
we're here, it's such a big organization ...... Our group had an idea for collaborating with a leading Irish 
company on some quite sophisticated development but HQ in California was very reluctant. They also had 
another strategy which affected their decision not to go ahead with that'. While some more development work 
may move to the TNCs' Irish subsidiaries the impulse towards centralized control and the continuing 
difficulties (social rather than technical) of transnational communication mean that this process is likely to be 
very slow and quite limited. This clearly fits the argument I have made that the Irish regional software 
complex is very important to TNC efforts to simultaneously be cost-effective and to maintain corporate 
control. Moving development work abroad threatens this control even if it might be more cost-effective. 
 
The last few years have however seen an expansion of call centres, and the movement of distribution, 
logistics management and finance and human resources functions to these regional hubs. This demands new 
skills in management and communications and places further demands on the telecommunications 
infrastructure of the countries involved. However, it does not offer much prospect for the Irish economy 
obtaining access to the key competencies of software - development and marketing - through these channels. 
Marketing remains tied to the major cities or at least must be close to the major markets in order to facilitate 
information flows and development, as we have seen, is likely to remain in the home country. 
 
Nonetheless, the emergence of their Irish operations as regional operations hubs for some TNCs does mark a 
significant departure from the earlier experience of dependent development where the role of the Irish 
operation in coordinating international functions was highly limited. Ireland has emerged as a locality which 
manages relations with economic actors in a whole range of other countries - many more developed than 
itself. If Ireland is still dependent on TNCs, it is dependent in new ways with new opportunities. And if it has 
been able to build a learning economy of sorts in this sector, it is a learning economy which is defined as 
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much by the local ability to support the performance of a role in a global corporate chain, and to play a 
critical role in supporting that chain, rather than in a local ‘innovative milieu’. 
 
But agglomeration and territorial specialization does not necessarily insulate a region from global 
competition, as Storper (1992) suggests - it is the basis of getting to compete at all. Global competition is 
increasingly moving towards more intense competition between a few leading contenders in each field - be 
they firms in product markets or regions in the ‘market’ for industrial locations. Each time local networks 
generate improved productivity this becomes the assumed baseline for the next round of inter-firm 
negotiations - at each stage the requirements for even entering the game are forced up a level. Localization 
theorists are therefore correct to argue that agglomeration and local networks can provide production and 
innovation efficiencies. However they fail to recognize that these efficiencies become the assumed basis of 
further rounds of cost competition as the dominant firms can set regions, suppliers and work forces against 
one another. Just as we have seen that ‘cooperation’ and ‘learning by monitoring’ can be the terrain of new 
forms of power relations, so agglomeration economies are the basis of new forms of cost competition. New 
development paths open up but regions remain heavily constrained by the dominant firm’ ability to set the 
cost and technological conditions for this development. 
 
LOCAL LEARNING? THE EMERGING SOFTWARE DEVELOPMENT INDUSTRY 
 
One of the striking aspects of the development of the Irish software industry has been the emergence of a 
dynamic indigenous software development industry at the same time as the arrival of the TNCs doing 
manufacturing and localization. However, the indigenous  sector has had few direct links with these TNCs. In 
fact, it represents an example of a very different process from that outlined above - it emerged largely from a 
set of local dynamics and over time has been increasingly incorporated into global innovation and business 
networks. There are a number of relatively large Irish companies but two thirds of the companies employ less 
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than 10 people. Irish companies differ in their emphasis on export and import markets but reliance on export 
markets is increasing all the time, encouraged by government subsidies. Managers in Irish software 
development firms are perhaps more likely to know someone in Microsoft's head office in Seattle than they 
are to know someone in Microsoft's European Operations Centre in Sandyford, County Dublin.  
 
(i) The Growth of a Local Software Development Industry
An awareness of international technical developments (facilitated in part by the emergence of the Internet), 
return migration of people who had worked in TNCs abroad and the experience of some employees in TNCs 
in Ireland helped to build some local firms However, the key organizational dynamics behind the emergence 
of the Irish software development industry were local and indigenous Irish firms generally emerged relatively 
autonomously of TNCs. 
 
In 1987 the software industry was dominated by tiny firms providing services and consultancy to businesses 
which were beginning to adopt IT systems (An Córas Tráchtála, 1987). India has expanded its software 
industry by providing these programming services on a global basis, largely to US firms, and then building 
their own firms on the foundations of this business. Ireland did not go as far down this road of providing 
international programming services. Its labour costs would not have been low enough to compete directly 
with India in any case. One TNC manager in California claimed that his company could get approximately 4-
6 engineers in India and two in Ireland for the price of one Silicon Valley engineer. However, Ireland has 
gradually developed a range of firms which sell software products in international niche markets in systems 
software and in some business applications markets. As such the products which the Irish industry provides 
tend to be quite technical and can avoid having to directly challenge the dominance of  the major US firms in 
consumer packaged software markets. 
 
Some crucial local factors, such as heavy investment in education (especially engineering and computer 
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science), an English-speaking workforce and an investment in telecommunications, prepared Irish firms to 
take advantage of opportunities in the newly created independent software industry. Internship programmes 
in computer science degrees and the development of software engineering quality programmes in universities 
helped to foster industry-university links. There was little state policy encouraging local software 
development. In fact it occurred almost `by accident' - the crucial factor being heavy educational investment 
which was originally prompted by the desire to attract TNCs to Ireland. While some individuals in state 
bodies were quite active in promoting the industry and working with Irish firms, the overall level of 
resources devoted to the industry was low.  However, the youth of the industry and the speed of technical 
change meant that there were a wide range of market opportunities. The industry culture was relatively open 
in the early years and something of a technical community, linked to international trends, developed - 
especially around the Unix environment which is a particular strength in Ireland. Furthermore, start-up costs 
are low in software as the main initial costs are those for labour. 
  
By looking briefly at the sources of firms in this sector we can see the importance of the emergence of local 
factors: 
 
a. Some firms which provided `bespoke' or custom services to businesses expanded this business into making 
consultancy kits and then into products, gradually expanding into export markets. These firms did rely to a 
degree on TNCs in all industries in Ireland for IT development projects and it could be argued that Irish 
companies wouldn't have demanded the same level of IT work in the absence of the TNCs. The dynamic was 
basically local however, with individuals with particular skills setting up shop and some of them managing to 
turn this into a longer-term future. These `firms' basically provided labour services but could demand higher 
premiums as contractors than as wage-workers due to the extensive skill shortages in the industry. 
 
b. A second group were firms in other industries, such as telecommunications or computer hardware, which 
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began to spin off their software divisions. Some of these were TNCs, some were semi-state bodies and others 
were private Irish firms. Again however the dynamic was local as domestic managers created new 
competencies and business for their divisions and convinced the management of the parent company to 
support their projects. A number of Irish firms were founded by users of software in vertical markets such as 
banking and training who used their knowledge of these markets to open up opportunities for their business. 
 
c. Other firms emerged almost directly from academia, being set up by professors and graduate students 
based on their own on-campus research.  
 
The growth of Irish firms was supported by the emergence of a local culture among software developers in 
Dublin. `There was a lot of swapping of ideas going on from about the mid-80s on. Anything real that goes 
on is informal" (Developer/Entrepreneur, Irish Software Development Firm). Another developer's comments 
revealed the way that informal associational networks can have an important impact even when not explicitly 
recognized by the actors involved: "Those industry groups are really just talking shops, they don't have any 
real impact. But in fairness I suppose I'm being a bit bilious towards them. I do meet a lot of people there. 
The informal human networks are more important than the formal industry or professional association stuff. 
Then I'll ring up Michael and say `what was that tool you were talking about to debug program X? And 
where would I get it?' So it's good that way. There's a lot that goes on among the people that go there" 
(Developer/Manager, US TNC doing development in Ireland). 
 
There is a great deal of `job-hopping' within the industry. Although this has increased in the last couple of 
years, as a labour shortage begins to bite, the institutional preconditions for it have been created over the 
course of the development of the industry. Flat organizational structures with few opportunities for internal 
promotion, local concentration of firms, `loaning out' of workers and work teams among firms and an uneven 
distribution across firms of opportunities for technically challenging work have all helped to generate high 
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levels of inter-firm mobility. The dense social networks within the various segments of the industry help to 
hold the system together. Employees know each other from their county of origin and local neighbourhood 
(particularly from rural and urban middle class neighbourhoods), from schools and colleges and from inter-
firm career patterns. Ireland is a country of dense and interlocking social networks (at least within social 
classes). This helps to facilitate both local and global networks - sometimes resulting in patterns of `chain 
migration' between firms as friends follow each other to new careers. There are also the formal associations 
which provide a forum for such networks. Information flows relatively freely through the industry about the 
reputations of employees and companies - facilitating job hopping as well as making it workable. In many 
ways then the growth of the indigenous Irish software development industry matches the localization 
theorists’ view of ‘industrial districts’ or ‘innovative milieux’. However, the story does not end there. 
 
(ii)  Global Competition: Taking the Local Global?
The opening of global markets is generally seen as a factor in firms' environments which increases the 
external threats to them from competition but has little direct impact on the organization of the firm itself. 
However, `going global' and competing in export markets involves profound organizational changes for the 
firms involved. Irish software firms cannot sustain themselves in local markets alone and therefore the 
industry as a whole has been faced with a rush of firms into global markets. This export focus has been 
facilitated by the focus of Irish companies on products rather than services. Not only are they easier to export 
but products make relative labour costs less critical than in computer service markets since it is possible to 
amortize development costs over the sales of many copies of the product (Schware, 1989). Nonetheless 
labour costs remain a significant portion of Irish development companies budgets, in part because of their 
early stage of growth and heavy focus on development tasks and technology rather than on market-building 
activities. 
 
The issue in the software industry is not, despite the hype, a lack of technical excellence and innovation in 
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emerging industries. As one manager put it `People think the software industry is 90% technical development 
and 10% marketing. In fact it's 60-40 marketing, but you can't tell the developers that'. There seems to be 
plenty of great ideas to go around. The issue is who will get to commercialize these ideas and under what 
conditions. 
 
The image which dominates the industrial districts literature is one of local networks of firms which compete 
on global markets but remain essentially local in nature. In fact, competing globally requires a reorganization 
of the company itself - in particular because of these marketing needs. A local firm cannot simply sit at their 
computers and then drop their latest creation on the world market - they must access the crucial marketing 
and distribution networks, which tend to be very crowded. While start-up costs in software may be very low, 
the costs of expanding beyond this initial phase may be very high with the result that many companies go out 
of business at this stage. An increasing number of Irish firms set up their own offices abroad to market their 
products. In 1993, 9 software companies had offices in the US. This has increased in 1996 to 17 and another 
7 are said to be considering setting up an office (IT's Monday, June 3rd., 1996). Total overseas employment 
of Irish software companies was 367 (8% of their total employment) in 1993 and this almost doubled to 714 
(11% of the total) in 1995. The impact on the organization and culture of these companies remains to be seen. 
However, an Irish Trade Board consultant in the US recently advised such Irish companies that in order to 
market successfully in the US `you must become, look and feel like an American company ' (quoted in IT's 
Monday,  June 3rd., 1996). 
 
`Going global' can be costly and risky. Therefore, for many firms, it often means forming an alliance of some 
kind with a firm from another country - typically a US firm in the Irish case. Irish firms have formed a 
number of alliances with US companies - some of these focus on technology sharing but others involve a 
combination of the Irish company's technology with the US company's marketing networks. While many of 
these alliances have developed through direct inter-firm links, many have also been prompted by government 
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and trade association efforts to build contacts between Ireland and the US. The Irish Software Association (a 
trade association) and the National Software Directorate (a state body) have led trade missions to 
Massachusetts and Silicon Valley in order to build up these kinds of links - resulting in a number of joint 
ventures. Similarly the Radius scheme, attached to the peace process in Northern Ireland, offers contacts for 
software companies in the border areas between Northern Ireland and the Republic to get involved in joint 
ventures with US firms. The importance of social networks in going global as well as in local economies is 
illustrated by the importance of one man to these developments in the Irish industry. John Cullinane, the 
founder in the 1960s of Cullinet (one of the first software companies), was approached by the director of the 
National Software Directorate in the early 1990s to try to build contacts between Massachusetts and the Irish 
software industry. Suitably impressed by the potential of the Irish development industry he was involved in 
promoting the Irish industry in the US and in the development of the Radius scheme.  Early this year he 
founded the Cullinane Group Ireland which is looking for investment opportunities in Irish software 
companies and which recruited the head of the National Software Directorate as its Irish manager. 
 
While joint ventures offer increased access to resources and valuable social networks to Irish firms they also 
reduce the autonomy of the firm and the industry as a whole. This tension is exacerbated in another trend 
which is likely to become quite important in the next few years - Irish companies going public on the stock 
exchange in the US. One Irish company has already had a successful launch in the US and the President of 
the US stock exchange visited Ireland in March 1996 in order to promote the stock exchange to Irish 
companies (in all industries). Approximately 40 Israeli high technology companies (7 of them software 
companies) are trading on the US stock exchange, so Ireland has quite a long way to go before it reaches that 
level. Nonetheless this is a trend which is likely to continue. In many cases, and in particular in the most 
successful firms, the situation is close to how one managing director of an Irish owned company (and a 
leading company in its market) described his company which may soon go public in the US: `We happen to 
be in Dublin but we are a US company. 65% of our revenues are from the US. It is very important for us to 
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get the mind share of analysts and standards bodies in the US'. Another Irish manager told me that they were 
coming up to an initial stock flotation on the stock exchange in the US and that `we may have to move some 
more of our development to the US since we need to have a significant presence there in order to convince 
investors. We don't want them to think that the development is all offshore'.  
 
The `local' social world of the US industry demands international investment opportunities but does not trust 
them unless they have a local presence in the US - thus setting in place a globalizing process for the Irish 
industry. We find that the local social relations of core markets and industries create a need for semi-
peripheral industries to go global in order to access crucial resources. The question becomes how to 
strengthen the hand of local firms in their negotiations with global actors while maintaining the 
embeddedness of these Irish firms in the local economy so that their contribution to local development 
intensifies rather than weakens. Innovation is not a simple matter of technical creativity in a borderless 
world. In fact it involves complex strategies of alliance-building and negotiation within the organizational 
and spatial hierarchy of the industry. While this may prove to be a fruitful process for successful firms, it 
poses significant challenges to the development of the locality or region. 
 
(iii) Global Investment Following Local Success  
In the last two years, US venture capital firms have shown increased interest in software firms in newly 
industrializing countries, including Ireland. Venture capital has always been lacking in Ireland and the banks 
are unwilling to support software firms (being generally less than supportive of industrial investment). While 
it remains to be seen how interested these investment companies are in the Irish industry, a growth of venture 
capital interest in Irish firms would mean an influx of resources with a loss of autonomy as the venture 
capital firms tend to manage their investments quite closely. Furthermore, it may well be a requirement of 
venture capital investment that firms move their top management to the US, and even to  near the venture 
capital firm. Some venture capital firms in Silicon Valley require even US firms to relocate to within 200 
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miles of their offices. However, the state has taken some action recently by setting up a 10 million pounds 
venture capital fund for domestic software companies. 
 
A typical pattern for Irish software firms has been the acquisition of successful firms by TNCs once they 
reach a certain level of turnover. This was particularly prevalent with the earlier, late 1980s, generation of 
firms but the pattern continues today. Indeed, many markets within the software industry are being 
consolidated and there has been heavy merger and acquisition activity in recent years. For some top software 
companies, such as Computer Associates and Symantec, acquisitions have been a large proportion of their 
growth in recent years. The importance of mergers and acquisitions is indicated by the fact that Symantec 
reviewed an average of one possible deal per day, from 1992 to 1995 (Gordon Ciochon, VP, Symantec 
Corporation, presentation at Software Manufacturers' Association, San Jose, November 1995).  
 
There have been a variety of results to this process in Ireland. A small company called Workhorse was 
bought by Aldus, a US firm, and disappeared altogether when Aldus left Ireland. On the other hand, one of 
Ireland's biggest software companies, Kindle Banking, was bought by a British TNC and continued to grow 
and maintain employment levels in Ireland. That TNC has recently merged with another TNC which is 
involved in a similar business to Kindle so it remains to be seen what the implications are for Kindle in the 
long run - in any case, the potential for local control over the firm and the industry is weakened. 
 
For the TNCs which dominate their particular industries, acquisition of small innovative start-up companies 
is not simply an exercise in profit-taking but is a critical element of their strategies to both foster innovation 
and control its speed and direction. Controlling the trajectory of technical change is the key to success in 
informational industries. The combination of heavy venture capital investment in start-ups which then 
typically cash out through acquisition by an industry leader is typical of regions such as Silicon Valley and, 
from the perspective of the leading firms, can result in a ‘manageable’ level of innovation. 
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Therefore, and echoing earlier discussions of cost competitiveness and power relations, local agglomerations 
and networks may be critical to the activity of innovation but the overall technical trajectory of informational 
industries is increasingly set by global alliances and acquisitions. The reason why  analyses of high 
technology regions which focus almost exclusively on local dynamics (Scott, 1993; Saxenian, 1994) have 
been nevertheless been highly informative and insightful is precisely because regions such as Silicon Valley, 
Route 128 and Los Angeles are at the top of the software global commodity chain. Within these regions 
relations between powerful global firms are often simultaneously local relations, masking the global 
character of the regions. This is clearly not the case for an emerging region like Ireland. 
 
NETWORKS AND DEVELOPMENT 
The story of the Irish software industry represents a very significant departure from previous eras in Irish 
industrial development where TNC branch plants remained relatively isolated from the local economy and 
essentially operated as isolated export processing zones (Sklair, 1988; O’Malley, 1989). The emergence of 
networks of local suppliers around the TNC operations is a new and promising phenomenon - one that is 
mirrored to some extent in other sectors (such as computer component sub-supply). These networks between 
firms have been a crucial part of the upgrading of the productive capabilities of the Irish economy and in 
some cases the networks have developed to the point where TNCs make the decision to simply contract with 
the members of the local agglomeration rather than setting up their own operations in Ireland. Furthermore, 
the emergence of a local infrastructure and culture of innovation has helped the indigenous software 
development industry to have an impact in international markets. While firms are small the industry as a 
whole has benefitted from local information sharing and the development of a local labour market with many 
experienced employees available to small, emerging firms. 
 
Networks, therefore, can provide a region with many competitive advantages and have a crucial role to play 
in the development of Newly Industrializing Economies. However, these networks cannot bear the burden of 
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the huge expectations which have been placed upon them. As the Irish case shows, while networks may 
emerge locally they will inevitably be internationalized as they become more successful. Some inter-firm 
networks such as the Irish printers and translation vendors are built from the start around global organizations 
and their needs.  Others, such as the software development agglomeration, emerge from essentially local 
processes but their own success leads their most successful members to themselves become globally 
organized. Furthermore, any successful region will soon attract the attention of international business 
organizations who seek to benefit from the competitive advantage of the locality and to maintain control over 
the technological trajectory of their industry - whether by buying local firms, getting involved in partnerships 
with them or setting themselves up locally as competitors trying to obtain some of the newly generated local 
business. Even when the basis of growth is local, the network will inevitably be linked to other localities over 
time and become part of linkages and production chains on a global scale. 
 
Therefore, the global constraints and resources available to localities are not limited merely to the demands 
of global competition in global markets, strenuous as these demands may be. In fact, the locality is likely to 
face global organizations on its own doorstep as its success is widely recognized. Even participating in global 
markets itself tends to push the competing organizations to organize on a global scale. It is the very need to 
be close to the most crucial markets which requires a global organizational structure. 
 
I have argued in this paper that local and regional agglomerations are in fact constitutive of global networks 
and make it possible for such networks to operate smoothly. Globalization theorists have generally argued 
that the imperatives of cost competitiveness, power relations and/or innovation mean that global networks 
will overwhelm local patterns of organization. Localization theorists argued that local social relations and 
organizational networks could provide a buffer against the pressures of the global economy - precisely 
because of the cost and innovation advantages of local agglomeration and the relations of cooperation within 
those regions. In contrast I have argued that both local and global networks are deeply dependent on each 
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other along each of the three dimensions I have mentioned - power relations, cost competitiveness and 
innovation. 
The Irish software agglomeration allows TNCs to consolidate their relationships between HQ and other 
firms, leaving their subsidiary or main vendor in Ireland to manage more unpredictable European sub-supply 
relationships directly and concentrating on the key strategic relationships from the US. The local 
organizational networks prove to be a crucial resource in stabilizing power relations and maintaining control 
over global corporate networks. 
 
Each time local networks generate improved productivity this becomes the assumed baseline for the next 
round of inter-firm negotiations as regards cost competitiveness - at each stage the requirements for even 
entering the game are forced up a level. Agglomeration and local networks can provide production and 
innovation efficiencies but these efficiencies become the assumed basis of further rounds of cost competition 
as the dominant firms can set regions, suppliers and work forces against one another. 
 
Finally, local agglomerations and networks help stimulate innovation but the overall technical trajectory of 
informational industries is set on a global scale and marketing products successfully requires substantial 
investment in a global organizational network. Information may travel across the globe instantaneously but 
communication and innovative activity is still heavily dependent on face-to-face communication in local 
social networks and the commercialization of innovation involves participating in the organizational politics 
of global networks. Once again, the global and the local are completely intertwined. 
 
This global penetration of localities changes the local economy as it raises the possibility that the flow of 
resources will tend to be out of the locality and into the global organizations. This has implications for local 
firms but even more so for the economic well-being of the region as a whole. Local sub-supply sectors are 
the most vulnerable to changes in technology and the global economy. They are also the most obviously 
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constrained by the structures and strategies of global firms. Nonetheless, local firms which become integrated 
into global networks may profit quite handsomely from these links. However, if the most successful firms 
become detached from their local regions the regions may prove unable to reproduce the local developmental 
dynamic which lead to the original success of the firms themselves as they find themselves losing the 
resources necessary to invest in the reproduction of the local knowledge infrastructure. It is crucial that the 
locality organize itself so that successful firms remain integrated into local institutions and the circulation of 
resources on balance serves to reproduce and extend the development of  the local region. The extent to 
which local and national states can bargain with mobile TNCs is severely limited. However, the emergence 
of local networks of firms does create a basis for integrating emerging local firms into a broader development 
project. 
 
The role of the state here becomes crucial. The state, even where it did not realize it, provided many of the 
conditions which enabled the development of the software industry in Ireland - in particular, education, 
telecommunications infrastructure and a local infrastructure for technological communication and learning. 
However, the Irish state has tended to provide these resources in order to attract foreign firms and has passed 
up on the possibility of integrating local firms into the institutions which support them. The state’s 
unconditional support of international business seems to have weakened its institutional inclination to bargain 
with local business. Nonetheless many opportunities to do so still present themselves - major efforts in 
training a new generation of computer personnel and the creation of a world class research infrastructure are 
two crucial areas where the state should act to support local industry but where it will also have the 
opportunity to get concessions from business. The state must also prompt firms in technologically vulnerable 
sectors, such as disk duplication, to diversify into other areas where they may be able to gain a  foothold. 
These state policies create the opportunity to make local firms more integrated into and dependent upon local 
institutions and to make them more accountable to local social and community forces through making 
particular bargains with the local firms, changing the contribution of local firms to the locality one bargain at 
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a time. 
 
Local networks of firms can be a crucial part of an economic development strategy and policies aimed at 
promoting such networks should certainly be put in place. However, such networks will inevitably become 
integrated into global networks and must face the issue of their relations with the major regions and firms in 
their industries. Local inter-firm networking alone does not guarantee that global networks will be beneficial 
to the local economy. The most powerful firms in the industry have significant power to set the parameters of 
the relationships which exist between firms. They also pursue strategies, in particular fostering competition 
between suppliers, which tend to maintain their position of power in these relationships. Nonetheless, these 
large global firms have increasingly pursued outsourcing and partnership strategies which do create 
opportunities for developing regions. Moving beyond dependent agglomerations to local networks with 
greater ability to direct their own technological development and business strategy requires the support of 
policy institutions and the state.  
 
The bargaining over the conditions under which these supports are provided provides states with an 
opportunity to direct the development trajectory of the economy and to integrate local firms into a social 
project of development. While the ability to ‘anchor’ transnational firms in this way is limited, there is 
significant potential to shape the development of emerging locally dominated industries. Sassen (1995) 
argues that the global economy is not so much a ‘placeless’ entity but a ‘grid of places’ constituted, at least in 
part, by the actions of cities and nation-states. We have seen in this paper how regional agglomerations also 
play a constitutive role in creating and maintaining this ‘grid of places’. This grid may ultimately provide the 
socio-economic infrastructure around which the global economy can be politically regulated and through 
which the political alliances necessary to develop such forms of governance can be forged. In this way local 
networks do provide an opportunity for states and communities to have a significant say in economic 
development, even in an age of economic globalization. However, simply promoting networks will not of 
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itself provide this opportunity. States and other socio-economic actors must be prepared to build upon the 
opportunities provided by the development of inter-firm networks to pursue broader social and economic 
projects. 
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